South Africa’s intelligence watchdog has called for sweeping legal changes that could allow state security agencies to intercept private WhatsApp calls and messages — a move that has raised alarm over privacy and surveillance in the digital age.
A classified report compiled by suspended Inspector-General of Intelligence (IGI) Imtiaz Fazel and submitted to President Cyril Ramaphosa, suspended police minister Senzo Mchunu, acting minister Firoz Cachalia, and Parliament’s Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence, reveals growing frustration among law enforcement agencies at their inability to monitor encrypted communications.
According to the report, intelligence structures, including the SAPS Crime Intelligence Division (SAPS-CI), are unable to intercept WhatsApp chats, calls, or voice notes — even with a warrant. This technological barrier, the report claims, is being exploited by criminal syndicates who coordinate operations through encrypted messaging platforms.
“There is an urgent need for the management of intelligence services to escalate this matter to the cabinet and law enforcement agencies,” the report states. “The Minister of Police should consider bringing about the regulatory changes that will compel WhatsApp to allow interception of communication by law enforcement agencies.”
The classified document argues that this inability to access WhatsApp communications represents a “massive loophole” in South Africa’s fight against organised crime, kidnappings, and other major offences. It proposes that the government review existing legislation — particularly Section 40(70) of the Regulation of Interception of Communications and Provision of Communication-related Information Act (Rica) — to compel service providers to cooperate with interception orders.
At present, the Office of the Interception Centre (OIC) — the state body responsible for authorised communication interception — cannot penetrate end-to-end encryption systems used by platforms like WhatsApp. The report suggests that the OIC’s outdated systems and infrastructure are no longer capable of supporting modern surveillance requirements.
“The capacity to intercept new communication media by the OIC should be regularly reviewed and attended to in terms of the development and acquisition of functional and appropriate systems,” the report says. It further recommends “a review of the regulatory environment to compel service providers to disclose the required information for investigation purposes.”
Criminals exploiting technology
Investigators are reportedly growing increasingly frustrated, claiming that organised crime networks now rely heavily on WhatsApp to communicate about illegal operations, knowing that law enforcement cannot monitor them.
“Organised criminal networks and/or syndicates have become aware of this limitation and are now frequently utilising WhatsApp communication to communicate their criminal activities,” the report reads.
It cites intelligence operations targeting the All-Truck Drivers Forum, during which officers discovered that the group’s members were using WhatsApp to plan and coordinate disruptive actions, making it impossible for authorities to intercept their communication.
Similarly, the inability to monitor WhatsApp calls and messages has complicated investigations into kidnappings for ransom, which continue to plague the country.
“The inability to intercept WhatsApp is frustrating the efforts of law enforcement agencies to decisively tackle kidnapping-for-ransom cases that are becoming prevalent in our country,” the report warns.
Challenges with unregistered SIM cards
Beyond encrypted apps, intelligence agencies are also struggling to monitor basic mobile communications due to widespread use of unregistered or non-Rica’d SIM cards. These cards, often sold illegally, allow users to make calls and send messages without linking their identity to a number — effectively providing anonymity.
The IGI report reveals that when SAPS-CI applies to a designated judge for permission to intercept such SIM cards, those requests are often rejected outright because there is no verifiable information about the owners.
“We were informed during our oversight engagements with management of SAPS-CI that the designated judge for interception is not inclined to issue direction in respect of an application wherein there is no validation of the identity of the person or persons against whose name(s) a SIM card is registered,” the report says.
As a result, many interception applications fail due to incomplete information from mobile network providers about the users of these cards. This legal and technical gap, combined with WhatsApp’s encryption, has left law enforcement unable to track or monitor critical communications linked to criminal investigations.
Dormant surveillance drones
Adding to the concern, the report also exposes a costly example of mismanagement within SAPS Crime Intelligence. It reveals that 15 drones, purchased in 2020 for surveillance purposes at a cost of nearly R500 000, remain unused to date.
“The divisional management of the SAPS-CI should consider conducting an internal investigation into the procurement of 15 drones and establish the circumstances which led to the non-utilisation of the drones,” the report recommends.
The drones were intended to support intelligence-gathering and surveillance operations but, according to the oversight findings, have never been deployed — further illustrating the dysfunction within parts of the intelligence sector.
Push for expanded powers
Fazel’s report underscores growing tension between privacy rights and state security demands. It acknowledges that existing interception laws have not kept pace with technology and calls for “urgent reforms” to ensure that law enforcement can access digital communications legally when investigating serious crimes.
However, privacy advocates and legal experts are likely to raise concerns about such proposals, warning that expanding surveillance powers without strong oversight mechanisms could lead to abuses and violate citizens’ constitutional right to privacy.
The push to intercept encrypted messages mirrors debates unfolding globally, as governments struggle to balance national security with individual freedoms in an era of digital communication.
For now, the matter rests with the Police Ministry and Cabinet, which must decide whether to pursue legislative amendments — a decision that could reshape the boundaries of state surveillance and private communication in South Africa.
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