JOHANNESBURG – A confidential investigation into the disappearance of high-value spares intended for South Africa's Falcon aircraft fleet – the very fleet used to transport the President, Deputy President, and other high-ranking officials – has unearthed a disturbing web of procurement irregularities, institutional failures, and breaches of national security protocols.
At the heart of the scandal is the loss of over R85 million linked to the unauthorised movement of spares, the use of forged documentation, the irregular access granted to foreign nationals, and what investigators suspect may be a deliberate attempt to circumvent established state protocols.
The SAA Technical-RSA report, dated April 3rd, details an investigation launched following a formal request to Security and Protection Services. It traces a murky paper trail and reveals conflicting statements surrounding the movement of Falcon spares from SAA Technical (SAAT) to Air Force Base Waterkloof in Pretoria, beginning in late 2022 and potentially continuing beyond.
The Falcon fleet, used for VIP transport, is classified as a national key point, meaning its spare parts, maintenance, and movement are governed by strict protocols. The investigation, however, paints a picture of alarming disregard for these regulations.
On November 10th, 2022, spare parts were removed from SAAT without proper documentation or confirmation that they were received at Waterkloof. Shockingly, just days later, similar spare parts were removed again using the same documentation, this time with additional items handwritten onto the printed records.
These critical components, essential for aircraft readiness and the fleet’s secure operations, were moved under vague "loan agreements," with no evidence of their return. The report estimates that SAAT has suffered a financial loss of over R12 million from these missing parts alone – parts that were never paid for by Armscor, the state arms procurement agency.
Timeline of Irregularities:
- November 10, 2022: An email is sent requesting assistance from SAAT security for the removal of Falcon spares to Waterkloof. The documents were approved. On the same day, a staff member presented removal papers and attempted to move the parts. No official confirmation exists that these were received at Waterkloof.
- November 15, 2022: The same removal document is used again, now bearing handwritten additions. When questioned by the acting head of Security and Protection Services, the individual presenting the papers allegedly left without explanation.
- November 15, 2022: An email is sent requesting clarification. The person who originally transported the parts claims he returned them to SAAT after a technician at Waterkloof refused to accept them. However, the technician later denies this claim in an interview, stating he never saw or rejected any such delivery.
- November 14, 2022: A new “section 30” document is submitted for the same spares, citing the previous version had been lost, despite security staff confirming they still had a copy.
- Consultations and Interviews: Staff at Waterkloof and SAAT provide contradicting accounts. Some claim parts were handed to others, but the alleged recipients deny receiving them.
- May 2022: Months earlier, in a similar incident, components were removed on a “hire-loan” basis but were not returned or invoiced. No payment was made, and no accountability followed.
Further analysis of procurement documents revealed a glaring oversight: no official contract existed between SAAT, Armscor, and the SA Air Force (SAAF) for the Falcon components. Instead, purchases were made based on demand from SAAF and handled under a "prepayment" understanding that was never fulfilled.
Despite warnings from the contract management team and procurement officers that SAAT lacked the capacity to maintain Falcon aircraft and that such purchases fell outside of existing contracts, the deal proceeded. A total of 34 line items were procured, along with three items for repair – all without verified quantities or matching invoices.
In total, the Falcon-related irregularities have exposed the state to a financial risk amounting to R85,739,520. Investigators cite conflict of interest, misrepresentation, possible fraud, and systemic corruption as contributing factors.
Perhaps the most alarming discovery in the report is the involvement of seven foreign nationals who were neither vetted nor cleared by the Department of Home Affairs, yet were granted direct access to work on the presidential aircraft.
Security clearance records confirm that these individuals were never officially processed by immigration authorities or law enforcement. This unauthorised access, allegedly managed and overseen by Armscor, bypassed all standard operating procedures for national key points.
The unvetted foreign nationals:
- Litty Giullaume Jean Rene (France)
- Stefan Oliver Buschle (Germany)
- Tomas Nogueira Ferreira (Portugal)
- Janatova Marketa (Czech Republic)
- Joachin Fernad Paul Bourgeois (France)
- Pierre-Yves Christopher Remi Ellias (France)
- Mateus Nicolai Bohringer (Germany)
The SA Police Service has confirmed that these individuals were neither formally recorded nor cleared. The report now calls for an urgent investigation involving intelligence and national security agencies to determine how these individuals gained access to the presidential fleet.
The report concludes that this is not merely a case of isolated misconduct, but rather a case study in institutional failure. The continued participation of certain companies in public contracts, despite clear irregularities, suggests not only administrative weaknesses but also potential collusion.
The findings highlight the collapse of oversight structures within SAAT, Armscor, and the SAAF, and the lack of alignment with the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) and National Treasury regulations. The report calls for intervention at the national level and recommends the following reforms:
- Mandatory Training: All finance and supply chain staff across SAAT, Armscor, and the Department of Defence must undergo annual refresher training on the PFMA, procurement laws, and institutional policies.
- Automated Compliance Tracking: Implement systems that flag anomalies in contracts, payments, and stock movement in real time.
- Internal Audit Teams: Establish units that focus on supply chain management and report directly to the Department of Defence monthly.
- Professionalisation of Procurement: Streamline and depoliticise procurement teams for state-owned enterprises that handle sensitive assets.
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